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Abstract 
 
Every year, in the macroeconomic imbalances procedure (MIP), the European Commission 
examines the economic situation of member States, decides whether to launch an in-depth-review 
(IDR) and classifies countries into several categories, ranking from "no imbalances" to "excessive 
imbalances". The European Commission then releases some "specific country recommendations" 
(CSRs), detailing the economic measures to take to address the challenges and the imbalances. 
 
This procedure has few equivalents in the world and, in that context, the question of the extent to 
which the pressure stemming from the MIP procedure can incite member States to implement 
reforms can be raised.  
 
It is found that the pressure induced by the MIP classification is associated with more progress, 
whatever the regression used and whatever the controls. 
 
Besides, if control variables' coefficients are not always significant depending on the regressions, 
their signs are as expected: difficult or politically/socially sensitive recommendations are associated 
with less progress, especially in the area of structural reforms and public finances. As regards 
political factors, progress is relatively less important when the mandates are getting close to their 
ends than for newly elected governments. 
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1. Introduction and related literature 
 
The experience of the Global Crisis required policymakers to broaden EU macroeconomic 
surveillance beyond fiscal aspects. A number of macroeconomic imbalances (relating, for example, 
to current account balances, competitiveness divergences, private indebtedness, housing market 
dynamics, etc.) revealed themselves as key factors in triggering balance-of-payment crises and the 
recourse to financial assistance. The Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) was introduced in 
2011 with the aim of preventing the accumulation of harmful macroeconomic imbalances and foster 
their correction, once in place, by means of a system of surveillance comprising of recommendations 
and possible sanctions.7 
 
MIP surveillance follows a regular cycle. Cross-country analysis carried out in an Alert Mechanism 
Report (AMR) provides the basis for selecting a number of countries that also would be analysed in 
in-depth-reviews (IDR) by the Commission, with a view to assess the existence of imbalances that 
are harmful for macroeconomic stability, and evaluate their severity.8 
 
The in-depth reviews may result in the identification of no imbalances, imbalances, or excessive 
imbalances. Countries identified as having imbalances or excessive imbalances receive Country-
Specific Recommendations (CSRs) by the Commission and the EU Council in the context of the 
‘European semester’. For the countries identified with excessive imbalances, the Excessive 
Imbalance Procedure (EIP) may also be activated, which comprises of the delivery of a corrective 
action plan with a set of policy measures to be carried out within a pre-determined time frame. The 
repeated delivery of an insufficient corrective action plan or repeated lack of compliance with the 
policy measures detailed in the plan may imply sanctions for the countries that belong to the 
Eurozone. 
 
The two arms – preventive and corrective – similarly to those in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
have different objectives: the preventive arm helps Member States to adopt good policies that will 
lead to balanced medium-term growth, jobs and financial stability. The corrective arm aims to 
identify and correct policy failures or address major macroeconomic risks that are harmful for the 
economic developments in the Member State concerned and may generate negative spillovers to 
other Member States. 
 
Since its inception, MIP surveillance has been activated mainly to foster an orderly correction of 
imbalances accumulated before the financial crisis. In some cases, MIP surveillance was replaced 
by financial assistance programmes (Spain and Cyprus). In other situations, MIP surveillance was 
activated soon after the conclusion of programmes (Spain, Ireland, Romania, Portugal, and Cyprus). 
 
So far, the EIP has not been launched. The identification of excessive imbalances was instead 
followed by relatively prescriptive recommendations with deadlines, enhanced policy commitments 
by the Member States concerned (contained in their National Reforms Programmes), and a process 
of “specific monitoring” of the implementation of MIP-related policy commitments. The 
                                                          
7 The legal basis of the MIP are two regulations: one outlining the steps in the procedure (regulation (EU) 1176/2011), and 
one providing a scheme of sanctions in case of reiterated lack of compliance by Eurozone Member States (regulation (EU) 
1174/2011). 
8 In Regulation (EU) 1176/2011 imbalances are given a relatively broad definition, being "any trend giving rise to 
macroeconomic developments which are adversely affecting, or have the potential adversely to affect, the proper functioning 
of the economy of a Member State or of the economic and monetary union, or of the Union as a whole". 
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categorisation of MIP imbalances by the Commission has also been more articulated than envisaged 
by the MIP regulation, including considering the necessity of policy action and monitoring. 
 
Was the MIP effective in triggering policy action despite that fact that no use was made of the 
enhanced surveillance framework in the EIP Procedure, and the procedure remained far from the 
step of sanctions? 
 
Similar questions have been raised in recent studies. Darvas and Leandro (2015) analyse compliance 
to the Commission CSRs. They find a higher level of implementation for CSRs that are related to 
the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), followed by MIP-related CSRs, and then the remaining CSRs. 
A straightforward interpretation would be that the former two sets of CSRs are backed by a relatively 
higher degree of enforcement, as the associated procedures are the only ones foreseeing the 
possibility of sanctions. However, results may depend on other factors as well, including a discipline 
role played by markets or the political capital absorbed by complying to CSRs. The present analysis 
carries controls for these factors.  
 
It is the first time an assessment of the influence of a common procedure for the coordination of 
macroeconomic policies between the member States of an integrated area (namely the European 
Union) has been made, using the procedures launched in the aftermath of the crisis, to foster the 
correction of domestic and international imbalances. 
 
The Stability and Growth Pact has already been reviewed and criticized, with some ways for 
improvement proposed (Cf. for example Schuknecht et al. (2011) or Fischer et al. (2006)), but 
without any quantitative assessment on progress made by itself. 
 
The main quantitative evaluations that have been made are connected to the potential 
macroeconomic impact rather than on the assessment of progress of effective actions. Creel et al. 
(2012) is an example for such a simulation. This paper discusses the different reforms and 
subsequent fiscal rules which have emerged since 2011. It assesses the impact of fiscal rules on the 
output gap and inflation rate of three representative countries of the Eurozone, using a 
counterfactual. Castro (2011) also analyses whether Maastricht and Stability and Growth Pact fiscal 
rules have affected growth in the European Union negatively. A growth equation is specified for a 
group of 15 European Union countries (and 8 OECD countries) over the period 1970–2005 to 
analyse this issue. It is shown that the institutional changes that occurred in the European Union 
after 1992 were not harmful to growth and that growth was even slightly higher in the period in 
which the fulfilment of the 3% criteria for the deficit started to be officially assessed, i.e. after 1997. 
 
When looking at the role of external inducements like IMF programs, Alesina et al. (2006) find that 
they have at best a weak effect, and underline that problems of reverse causality are possible, in the 
sense that foreign aid should go to countries in trouble, so a correlation of bad policies and delayed 
stabilizations with foreign aid can have different causal interpretations. Another pessimistic view 
about the effects of foreign aid is in Easterly (2006).  
 
In the case of the influence of the MIP procedure, these problems of reverse causality should be 
limited in the sense that the assessment of progress made induces no granting of foreign aid which 
may incite to deter or defer reforms, only incentives to reform further.  
 
Moreover, the impact of the classification in the MIP procedure is introduced with one-year lag, 
compared to progress assessment, thus reverse causality is less likely. 
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In addition, reverse causality is all the less likely to happen since more progress induces on the 
contrary an easing of the classification at the end of rolling year, as shown in the Annex 2 of 
European Commission (2016), controlling besides for a “synthetic indicator of economic 
conditions”, capturing the relevant variables summarizing the imbalances identified in IDRs for 
related countries. 
 
This effect goes in the opposite direction of the one tested, and thus pleads that coefficients' 
variables, if there is to be reverse causality should be under-stated. 
 
The problem would rather be the one of omitted variable, which would be correlated with the MIP 
classification. To try to face this problem, several key control variables (markets pressure, GDP 
growth, electoral cycle) are introduced, but possible biases may still be observed. Hence our results 
should rather be interpreted as correlations at this stage; they do not capture causal effects. 
 
The second part analyses the data used and give some stylized facts about CSRs and MIP categories. 
The third part will perform econometric relations, taking into account the impact of the MIP category 
and controlling for other factors, including potential reform fatigue; complementary regressions 
address the issue of stability of relations over time, potential endogeneity and selection bias. The 
last part concludes. 
 
 
2. Data used and stylized facts 
 
2.1. Description of the variables used 
 
As regards the dependent variable, which sets policy progress as assessed by the European 
Commission, each data point corresponds to recommendations at a disaggregated policy field, 
defined at a more detailed level than that found in Council CSRs as published (namely “sub-CSRs”). 
 
Progress with respect to recommendations is thus defined at the following level of disaggregation 
(for more detail, see Annex): Public finances; Financial sector; Labour market, social inclusion and 
education; Structural policies; and Public administration and business environment. 
 
The indicator of policy progress distinguishes five degrees of progress, ranging from 0 to 100: 0=no 
progress; 25=limited progress; 50=some progress; 75=substantial progress; and 100=full 
achievement.  
 
The main explanatory variable that is tested is the classification of each country in a MIP category, 
the year before progress is assessed, which signals the magnitude of the pressure induced by the 
European Commission. There are three categories for MIP imbalances (no imbalances=0; 
imbalance=1; excessive imbalances=2). 
 
Besides this main explanatory variable, several key control variables are envisaged (see their 
definition in Annex), which are likely to influence the extent to which countries may comply with 
policy recommendations. 
 
A dummy (“hard-to-comply with recommendation”) takes value one for policy fields where the 
political cost of reforms is higher either because the group of potential losers is wide or because it 
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is well organised (e.g. Olson (1965)). This if important to control for since progress to make may be 
more difficult if the related sub-CSRs fall in this category. This variable is partly judgemental, but 
a robustness regression is performed without this indicator (Cf. table 3, columns [5] and [6] in the 
sub-part 3.1). 
 
GDP growth enables to control for the current economic situation, specific to the country (since 
there is besides a year fixed effect, which controls for the global economic situation). This variable 
may potentially have two different impacts. First, if the economic situation is favourable, it may 
deter the government to reform, waiting for the positive effects of economic growth. Conversely, it 
may help to smooth the potentially negative short-term impact of reforms in terms of social and 
economic costs. Thus, the overall effect is undetermined, but this variable should be controlled for 
in any case. 
 
The sovereign spread with the benchmark German rate indicates the potential pressure imposed by 
financial markets. It is lagged to avoid endogeneity problems.  
 
To control for the political cycle, dummies indicating legislative elections at most one year before, 
or by next year, are introduced, using the World Bank political database. Indeed, Alesina et al. 
(2006), analysing why countries delay stabilizations of large and increasing budget deficits and 
inflation,  on a vast sample of countries, find that stabilizations are more likely to occur when time 
of crisis occur, at the beginning of term of office of a new government, in countries with "strong" 
governments (i.e. presidential systems and unified governments with a large majority of the party in 
office), and when the executive faces less constraints. The nature of political regimes (presidential 
or not) having a limited variance on the short period considered in the article, the most important 
factor to control for is thus the fact of being or not at the beginning of term of office, which is done 
by considering recent elections and elections to come. 
 
The policy area to which the sub-CSR belongs are split between the five categories detailed above 
(public finances; financial sector; labour market, social inclusion and education; structural policies; 
Public administration and business environment). This is introduced as a control variable since 
average progress may not be the same depending on the policy area. For example, structural policies 
are expected to be difficult to implement (e.g. Rajan (2004)), in spite of their potential impact on 
productivity (e.g. Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003) or Bourlès et al. (2013) for a panel of OECD 
countries). 
 
Besides these standard factors, in the first two columns, to capture potential reform fatigue, past 
progress and number of sub-CSRs, cumulated until the year before, have been taken into account. 
More precisely, for each year, countries are classified by quartiles, depending on the sum of progress 
over all their sub-CSRs and the number of sub-CSRs, higher quartiles corresponding respectively to 
more progress and more sub-CSRs. This calculation enables to neutralize the streamlining of the 
number of CSRs and sub-CSRs which appears in the second part of the period under review, and 
have homogenous calculations. 
 
 
2.2.  Stylized facts 
 
In the whole, 23 countries are covered, namely all the member States of the European Union (except 
Croatia, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland and Portugal, which were under program and/or not covered by the 
MIP procedure), over the years 2013 to 2017. 
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As can be seen in table 1, the number of sub-CSRs is more important for countries with excessive 
imbalances, compared with countries with imbalances or no imbalances, the latter two categories 
displaying limited difference. 
 
Besides, from 2015, the number of sub-CSRs diminishes compared to previous years, due to a 
“streamlining” of recommendations, which induces some heterogeneity over time that must be taken 
into account when considering reform fatigue (see the definition of cumulated number of sub-CSRs 
in Annex). 
 
Table 1: Number of sub-CSRs per MIP classification 
Year MIP status Median sum of sub-CSRs by country 
Mean sum of sub-
CSRs by country 
2013 No imbalance 21,0 20,2 
2014 No imbalance 17,0 16,4 
2015 No imbalance 9,0 8,3 
2016 No imbalance 8,5 8,4 
2017 No imbalance 8,0 7,1 
2013 Imbalance 19,0 18,4 
2014 Imbalance 17,0 20,9 
2015 Imbalance 10,0 9,3 
2016 Imbalance 11,0 8,9 
2017 Imbalance 8,5 8,2 
2013 Excessive imbalance 31,0 31,0 
2014 Excessive imbalance 26,5 26,5 
2015 Excessive imbalance 17,5 16,3 
2016 Excessive imbalance 16,0 15,0 
2017 Excessive imbalance 13,5 13,3 
 
Sources: European Commission, authors’ calculations. 
 
 
When analysing the average progress by MIP classification and year (see table 2), countries under 
the “excessive imbalance” classification display more progress compared to the other two 
categories, at least until 2015. Then, the difference falls in 2016 and to a lesser extent in 2017, which 
suggests, prima facie, some possible reform fatigue in the implementation of recommendations and 
reforms. 
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Table 2: Average progress per MIP classification  
Year MIP status Average progress 
2013 No imbalance 37,1 
2014 No imbalance 37,2 
2015 No imbalance 36,3 
2016 No imbalance 39,2 
2017 No imbalance 35,8 
2013 Imbalance 39,5 
2014 Imbalance 35,7 
2015 Imbalance 38,9 
2016 Imbalance 35,3 
2017 Imbalance 36,0 
2013 Excessive imbalance 45,2 
2014 Excessive imbalance 49,5 
2015 Excessive imbalance 41,5 
2016 Excessive imbalance 39,0 
2017 Excessive imbalance 39,6 
 
Sources: European Commission, authors’ calculations. 
 
 
 
3. Econometric results: the MIP procedure has a positive impact, structural and 
public finances reforms are more difficult to implement and reform fatigue 
has nuanced effects 
 
3.1. Baseline specifications 
Assessing to what extent MIP surveillance strengthens policy progress requires controlling for other 
factors that play a role in driving reform outcomes. To this purpose, a regression specification has 
been tested where an indicator of progress with respect to previous EU recommendations is put in 
relation with the categories for MIP imbalances and additional control variables that are likely to 
influence the extent to which countries are likely to comply with policy recommendations. 
 
Taking into account all the explanatory variables detailed in the sub-part 2.1, the baseline 
specification is as follows: 
 
Log (1+sub-CSR compliance score) = α1.constant + α2.MIP imbalance category + α3.hard-to-comply 
with recommendation dummy + α4.GDP growth + α5.interest rates spreads in previous year + 
α6.Elections in previous year + α7.Elections by following year + α8.cumulated progress + 
α9.cumulated number of sub-CSRs + vt + + vpa + εct 
 
With vt = year fixed effects, vpa dummies for policy areas and εct the residual of the equation. 
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As regards the dependent variables, the scores are transformed as log(1+score) to smooth the effect 
of the retained scaling, which ranks from 0 to 100, and may otherwise be somewhat arbitrary. 
 
Since the dependent variable is detailed at the country / year / sub-CSR level and the explanatory 
variables at the country / year level, clustering at the country / year level has been performed. 
 
Moreover, the explanatory variable being not continuous, ordered probit are performed in columns 
[1], [3] and [5], and ordinary least squares (OLS) in columns [2], [4] and [6] of table 3 as robustness 
checks. 
 
Results displayed in table 3 show that in all cases, over the whole period, the MIP imbalance 
category has a significant and positive impact on progress, at the 5% level. with approximately the 
same magnitude. This suggests that MIP surveillance favours indeed policy progress and seems to 
be robust. 
 
Recommendations which are hard-to-comply with, a priori, have a negative and significant impact 
at the 1% level (columns [1] to [4]). This is as expected, since these recommendations are more 
difficult to implement, being politically costly. The omission of this variable in columns [5] and [6] 
does not alter main results. 
 
GDP growth and interest rate spreads are not significant. Higher growth should make reforms easier 
to implement, despite potential complacency. The fact that the opposite effect may also play (namely 
a moral hazard effect for governments which are less prone to reform when relying on GDP growth) 
may explain the overall low significance of this variable. 
 
The elections to come are always significant and have a relatively more negative impact on progress 
than recent elections. This is consistent with the usual findings of electoral cycles (Cf. for example 
Alesina et al. (2006)). 
 
The past cumulated number of sub-CSRs plays indeed a negative and significant role at the 1% level, 
which means that the more reforms have been required in the past, the less progress is implemented, 
which would be consistent with the idea of reform fatigue. This being said, if the country has 
cumulated high progress in the past, it is more likely to go on doing so, the variable "cumulated 
progress until previous year" being significant at the 1% level and positive. Thus, this dual finding 
nuances the idea of reform fatigue. 
 
In terms of policy areas, public finances and structural policies are the ones associated with least 
progress, which is in line with the priors associated to difficulties of these policies. It is in particular 
the case for columns [5] and [6], where the “hard-to-comply with recommendation” variable, which 
captures in particular components of structural reforms’ policy area (see definition in Annex) is not 
included. 
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Table 3: MIP surveillance and CSR progress, data at detailed recommendation 
level, all EU members (except countries under programme) 
Dependent variable: CSR 
compliance score [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Explanatory variables 
                                   
Estimation method: 
Ordered 
probit OLS 
Ordered 
probit OLS 
Ordered 
probit OLS 
MIP imbalance category 0.175** 0.151** 0.153** 0.135** 0.149** 0.132** 
  (0.074) (0.068) (0.068) (0.061) (0.067) (0.061) 
Hard-to-comply with 
recommendation, dummy 
-0.241*** -0.284*** -0.205*** -0.250***     
(0.069) (0.089) (0.068) (0.088)     
GDP growth -0.013 -0.035 0.017 -0.007 0.016 -0.009 
  (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.032) 
Interest rate spread in 
previous year 0.020 0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.009 -0.008 
  (0.028) (0.031) (0.029) (0.033) (0.029) (0.033) 
Cumulated progress until 
previous year 0.090*** 0.080***         
  (0.021) (0.021)         
Cumulated number of sub-
CSRs until previous year -0.067*** -0.055***         
  (0.019) (0.018)         
Elections in previous year -0.077 -0.096 -0.165* -0.168* -0.157* -0.159* 
  (0.088) (0.087) (0.095) (0.096) (0.094) (0.096) 
Elections by following 
year -0.199** -0.217** -0.224** -0.246** -0.219** -0.240** 
  (0.100) (0.102) (0.108) (0.111) (0.108) (0.112) 
Policy area “financial 
sector” 0.087 -0.149 0.131 -0.103 0.184 -0.038 
 (0.192) (0.202) (0.184) (0.199) (0.179) (0.197) 
Policy area “labour 
market, social inclusion & 
education” 
-0.144 -0.054 -0.161* -0.058 -0.172* -0.073 
 (0.091) (0.110) (0.090) (0.108) (0.090) (0.109) 
Policy area “public 
administration & business 
environment” 
0.099 0.179 0.048 0.137 -0.046 0.024 
 (0.116) (0.138) (0.110) (0.132) (0.111) (0.123) 
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Policy area “structural 
policies” -0.139 -0.043 -0.158* -0.064 -0.251*** -0.178* 
 (0.091) (0.121) (0.086) (0.112) (0.087) (0.104) 
Policy area “public 
finances”  -0.164* -0.304*** -0.162* -0.299*** -0.177* -0.319*** 
 (0.093) (0.114) (0.092) (0.112) (0.091) (0.112) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering at country-year 
level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1463 1463 1495 1495 1495 1495 
Pseudo R-squared 0.03   0.02   0.01   
R-squared   0.05   0.03   0.03 
RMSE   1.23   1.23   1.24 
              
 
Note: *, ** and ***: coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Student-t are reported in parenthesis.  
Standard errors are robust with-respect to clustering at the country-year level. 
Dependent variable: CSR compliance score defined at disaggregated policy field. 0=no progress; 25=limited progress; 
50=some progress; 75=substantial progress; 100=full achievement. The scores are transformed as log(1+score) to smooth the 
effect of the retained scaling. 
MIP categories: no imbalances=0; imbalances=1; excessive imbalances=2. This detail has been retained to fit with the MIP 
categories in the end of the period. The MIP categorisation refers to the preceding year. The correspondence between the 
classifications in MIP categories used in 2013 and 2014 is the one displayed in table 4.3 of European Commission (2016), 
with the two categories qualified as being excessive imbalances in 2013 corresponding to excessive imbalances category of 
2014. 
The "hard-to-comply with recommendations" variable is a dummy variable taking value 1 for sub-CSRs belonging to the 
following fields: Long-term sustainability of public finances, including pensions; Employment protection legislation & 
framework for labour contracts; Wages & wage setting; Health & long-term care; Competition in services; Telecom, postal 
services & local public services; Energy, resources & climate change; Transport; Public administration; State-owned 
enterprises; Civil justice; Shadow economy & corruption.  
Interest rate spreads are expressed as the difference of the 10-year government bond yield with the one of Germany. 
"Elections in previous year" and "Elections in following year" are dummies equal to one if legislative elections have taken 
place at most one year before the related year or if these elections are to take place in at most one year, respectively. 
Cumulated progress and number of sub-CSRs until previous year are based on classifications by quartiles, depending on the 
sum of progress over all sub-CSRs and the number of sub-CSRs, higher quartiles corresponding respectively to more progress 
and more sub-CSRs.  
Source: European Commission, Eurostat, World Bank political database, national sources, own calculations. 
 
 
3.2.  Robustness checks: instrumental regressions confirm the impact of the MIP 
procedure; results seem to alter in the end, but not for countries remaining in the 
procedure  
The VOX column by Bricongne and Turrini (2017), elaborating on the results from European 
Commission (2016) finds some impact of the MIP procedure on progress over the first years, without 
implementing the excessive imbalance procedure or any sanctions. But the relation shown in Table 
3 may still alter over time. Indeed, some recent documents such as Efstathiou and Wolff (2018) 
seem to challenge the impact of the MIP procedure: “Overall implementation of recommendations 
by EU countries has worsened in the last few years, in particular when it comes to recommendations 
addressed to countries with excessive macroeconomic imbalances”, as could also be noticed in the 
statistics in the sub-part 2.1. 
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Still, the impact of the MIP procedure should be established with specifications that enable to control 
for alternative indicators to avoid the bias of omitted variables (as already done in Table 3), 
controlling also for potential reverse causality and selection biases.  
 
Complementary regressions have been performed to address these issues in table 4. 
 
To check for reform fatigue, besides what is done in columns [1] and [2] in table 3, the period is 
split into two (see columns [1] and [2] of table 4). 
 
Since progress may influence MIP categorisation, as shown in European Commission (2016), in 
Annex 2, there may be reverse causality, even if the influence should be in the opposite direction 
(more progress will improve the categorisation and thus diminish the value of MIP category, being 
given the retained convention in calculations). To neutralize this source of potential endogeneity, 
instrumentation is performed in columns [3] and [4] of table 4, over the whole period and the last 
two years respectively. Instruments correspond to the synthetic indicators of economic conditions 
in stocks and flows, used in Annex 2 of European Commission (2016) (see also definition in Annex), 
taking into account imbalances identified as affecting each country in in-depth reviews. 
 
Besides, since countries that exit the procedure are, by definition, those which have implemented 
more progress, there may be a selection bias. To control for this effect, a sub-sample of countries 
which have been classified with imbalances or excessive imbalances over the whole period has been 
retained in columns [5] and [6], corresponding to France, Italy, Bulgaria, Netherlands, Spain and 
Sweden. 
 
Results in table 4 show that the MIP procedure impact seems to vanish in the end of the period 
(column [2]). Instrumentation over the whole period confirms and even amplifies the magnitude of 
the results for the impact of the MIP procedure, the Fisher coefficient checking the rule of thumb of 
10 (column [3] compared to column [1])9 but significance disappears again on the end of the period 
(column [4]). 
 
Still, when concentrating on the sub-sample of countries which are always classified with 
imbalances, this impact remains, whatever the period (columns [5] and [6]).  
As regards the difficulty of implementation of structural policies, this policy area is significant at 
the 5% level and negative for this sub-sample, the “public finances” policy area and the “hard-to-
comply with recommendation” variable turning non-significant. The latter remains significant at the 
1% or 5% level and negative whatever the sub-period (columns [1] and [2]) and when 
instrumentation is implemented (columns [3] and [4]). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9 The instrument used is the synthetic indicator of economic conditions (see definition in Annex), based among other variables 
on general government debt. Using this single indicator alone as instrument confirms the results. The MIP imbalance category 
coefficient is even higher and equal to 0.441 and still significant (at the 10% level though) with the Fisher coefficient equal 
to 9.9. Kriesi (2014) confirms the political impact of this variable. 
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Table 4: MIP surveillance and CSR progress, complementary specifications using 
sub-periods, instrumentation and sub-samples of countries always with imbalances 
  Sub-period [2013:2015] Sub-period [2016:2017] 
MIP 
imbalance 
category 
instrumented: 
[2013:2017] 
MIP 
imbalance 
category 
instrumented: 
[2016:2017] 
Sub-sample 
of countries 
always with 
imbalances: 
[2013:2017] 
Sub-sample 
of countries 
always with 
imbalances: 
[2016:2017] 
Dependent variable: 
CSR compliance 
score [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Explanatory 
variables 
                                   
Estimation method: 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered 
probit 
IV 
Regress 
IV 
Regress 
Ordered 
probit 
Ordered 
probit 
 
MIP imbalance 
category 
0.189** 0.088 0.244** 0.057 0.501*** 0.706** 
  (0.092) (0.102) (0.100) (0.214) (0.150) (0.357) 
Hard-to-comply with 
recommendation, 
dummy 
-0.179** -0.385*** -0.289*** -0.403*** -0.051 -0.371 
(0.081) (0.143) (0.088) (0.144) (0.119) (0.416) 
GDP growth 0.003 -0.107 -0.018 -0.123 0.169*** 0.042 
  (0.033) (0.089) (0.033) (0.087) (0.063) (0.095) 
Interest rate spread 
in previous year 0.023 0.030 0.005 0.013 -0.020 0.124 
  (0.031) (0.064) (0.033) (0.060) (0.047) (0.188) 
Cumulated progress 
until previous year 0.092*** 0.107*** 0.078*** 0.091*** 0.044 0.087 
  (0.028) (0.028) (0.021) (0.024) (0.040) (0.109) 
Cumulated number 
of sub-CSRs until 
previous year 
-0.053** -0.108*** -0.059*** -0.068** 0.019 -0.087 
  (0.025) (0.026) (0.020) (0.031) (0.041) (0.084) 
Elections in previous 
year -0.072 0.101 -0.107 -0.002 -0.479** 0.481 
  (0.113) (0.141) (0.086) (0.142) (0.191) (0.305) 
Elections by 
following year -0.200 0.155 -0.238** 0.008 -0.562*** 0.865*** 
  (0.124) (0.200) (0.105) (0.192) (0.195) (0.336) 
Policy area 
“financial sector” 0.087 0.130 -0.188 -0.022 -0.010 0.092 
 (0.223) (0.304) (0.201) (0.300) (0.345) (0.439) 
Policy area “labour 
market, social 
inclusion & 
education” 
-0.135 -0.084 -0.044 0.097 -0.204 -0.324 
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 (0.108) (0.193) (0.109) (0.226) (0.168) (0.346) 
Policy area “public 
administration & 
business 
environment” 
0.088 0.164 0.183 0.272 -0.096 -0.061 
 (0.144) (0.194) (0.138) (0.264) (0.249) (0.301) 
Policy area 
“structural policies” -0.127 -0.259 -0.029 -0.133 -0.332** -0.712** 
 (0.103) (0.209) (0.121) (0.239) (0.137) (0.289) 
Policy area “public 
finances”  -0.158 -0.195 -0.293*** -0.248 -0.024 0.149 
 (0.103) (0.203) (0.113) (0.226) (0.215) (0.340) 
Year F.E. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Control for policy 
area Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering at 
country-year level Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 1063 381 1514 381 449 117 
Pseudo R-squared 0.02 0.05     0.06 0.06 
R-squared     0.05 0.09     
RMSE     1.21 1.08     
Fisher coefficient 
(first stage of 
instrumentation) 
    73.2 21.3     
 
Note: *, ** and ***: coefficients significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. Student-t are reported in parenthesis.  
Standard errors are robust with-respect to clustering at the country-year level. 
Dependent variable: CSR compliance score defined at disaggregated policy field. 0=no progress; 25=limited progress; 
50=some progress; 75=substantial progress; 100=full achievement. The scores are transformed as log(1+score) to smooth the 
effect of the retained scaling. 
MIP categories: no imbalances=0; imbalances=1; excessive imbalances=2. This detail has been retained to fit with the MIP 
categories in the end of the period. The MIP categorisation refers to the preceding year. The correspondence between the 
classifications in MIP categories used in 2013 and 2014 is the one displayed in table 4.3 of European Commission (2016), 
with the two categories qualified as being excessive imbalances in 2013 corresponding to excessive imbalances category of 
2014. 
The "hard-to-comply with recommendations" variable is a dummy variable taking value 1 for sub-CSRs belonging to the 
following fields: Long-term sustainability of public finances, including pensions; Employment protection legislation & 
framework for labour contracts; Wages & wage setting; Health & long-term care; Competition in services; Telecom, postal 
services & local public services; Energy, resources & climate change; Transport; Public administration; State-owned 
enterprises; Civil justice; Shadow economy & corruption.  
Interest rate spreads are expressed as the difference of the 10-year government bond yield with the one of Germany. 
"Elections in previous year" and "Elections in following year" are dummies equal to one if legislative elections have taken 
place at most one year before the related year or if these elections are to take place in at most one year, respectively. 
Cumulated progress and number of sub-CSRs until previous year are based on classifications by quartiles, depending on the 
sum of progress over all sub-CSRs and the number of sub-CSRs, higher quartiles corresponding respectively to more progress 
and more sub-CSRs.  
The instruments used are the synthetic indicators of economic conditions (see definition in Annex). 
Source: European Commission, Eurostat, World Bank political database, national sources, own calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2019/04 
 
 
14 
 
4. Conclusion 
The pressure induced by the MIP classification is associated with more progress, and this 
result is robust whatever the regression used and whatever the controls. In this paper, we have 
tried to address potential endogeneity bias by using instrumentation techniques. However, 
there may still be biases linked to omitted variables in spite of the various indicators used. 
Hence our coefficients should rather be interpreted as correlations at this stage, not as causal 
effects.  
 
As regards reform fatigue, the effects are nuanced: less progress seems to be observed in the 
end of the period but countries that have cumulated most progress in the past, controlling for 
the number of reforms to implement, and those that remain in the procedure, do not register 
such a fall. 
 
This pressure, besides influences from financial market and business or political cycles, seems thus 
to promote additional efforts by member States or, at least, to concentrate these efforts in the required 
direction. 
 
If controls are not always significant depending on the regressions, their signs are as expected: 
difficult or politically/socially sensitive sub-CSRs are associated with less progress and structural 
reforms and public finances seem to be the most difficult policy areas. As regards political factors, 
progress is relatively less important when the mandates are getting close to their ends than for newly 
elected governments. 
 
Conversely, more progress induces an easing of the classification at the end of the period, as shown 
in the Annex 2 of European Commission (2016). There is thus a mutual influence between the two 
variables: a worsening of the MIP classification fosters more progress which, in turn, enables to ease 
subsequently the severity of the MIP classification. 
 
Besides, the assessment of the MIP procedure is not complete yet, in the absence of the launching 
of the excessive imbalances procedure and of the corrective arm. If used, the influence and 
magnitude of this part of the procedure, compared to the preventive arm, would be interesting to 
estimate. 
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ANNEX: 
Definition of variables 
 
Cumulated number of sub-CSRs until previous year: based on classifications by quartiles, 
depending on the number of sub-CSRs, higher quartiles corresponding to more sub-CSRs. Yearly 
quartile values are then cumulated from the start until previous year. 
 
Cumulated progress until previous year: based on classifications by quartiles, depending on the 
sum of progress over all sub-CSRs, higher quartiles corresponding to more progress. Yearly quartile 
values are then cumulated from the start until previous year. 
 
Elections in previous year: dummy equal to one if legislative elections have taken place at most 
one year before the related year (source: World Bank political database). 
 
Elections in following year: dummy equal to one if legislative elections are to take place in at most 
one year from the related year (source: World Bank political database). 
 
GDP growth: yearly growth rate of GDP at market price, chained-linked volume (source: Eurostat). 
 
Hard-to-comply with recommendation dummy: The classification of political or social 
sensitivity is made by setting a dummy equal to one for the reforms which are most likely to generate 
social or political opposition (with likely strikes, strong political oppositions or social unrest). It 
corresponds to the following fields: Long-term sustainability of public finances, including pensions; 
Employment protection legislation & framework for labour contracts; Wages & wage setting; Health 
& long-term care; Competition in services; Telecom, postal services & local public services; Energy, 
resources & climate change; Transport; Public administration; State-owned enterprises; Civil 
justice; Shadow economy & corruption.  
 
Interest rate spreads: difference of the 10-year government bond yield with the one of Germany. 
They are introduced with a one-year lag to minimize endogeneity issues. 
 
Policy areas: the five areas correspond to the following fields: 
 Public finances: Fiscal policy and fiscal governance; Long-term sustainability of public 
finances, including pensions; Reduce the tax burden on labour; Broaden tax bases; Reduce 
the debt bias; Fight against tax evasion, improve tax administration & tackle tax avoidance.  
 Financial sector: Financial services; Housing market; Access to finance; Private 
indebtedness. 
 Labour market, social inclusion and education: Employment protection legislation & 
framework for labour contracts; Unemployment benefits; Active labour market policies; 
Incentives to work, job creation, labour market participation; Wages & wage setting; 
childcare; Health & long-term care; Poverty reduction & social inclusion; Education; Skills 
& life-long learning.  
 Structural policies: Research & innovation; Competition & regulatory framework; 
Competition in services; Telecom, postal services & local public services; Energy, 
resources & climate change; Transport.  
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 Public administration and business environment: Business environment; Insolvency 
framework; Public administration; State-owned enterprises; Civil justice; Shadow 
economy & corruption. 
 
Synthetic indicator of economic conditions: this variable can be calculated using “stocks” or 
“flows”. The one using “stocks” notions is a sum of the normalized values of the following variables: 
general government gross debt, financial sector leverage, NIIP (net international investment 
position), corporate debt and households’ debt. The one using “flows” notions is a sum of the 
normalized values of the following variables: export market shares, unit labour costs, house prices, 
current account, financial sector liabilities’ growth and REER (real effective exchange rate). 
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